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Physical security
models, philosophies, and context
Karen A. Forcht
S. E. Krnck
James Madison University

ABSTRACT
This paper presents physical security of a computer facility within the context of a corpo
rate environment. The context is established from several different perspectives. It first presents
physical security philosophies and illustrates the philosophies via the Onion and Garlic Mod
els. It defines a process for identifying and describing transition strategies between security
levels. Once the models are defined, a Macro View of physical security is presented. This view
discusses physical security goals and critical factors such as budget, monitoring and redun
dancy. With this context established, the Micro View is presented. Its focus is on information
technology (IT) facilities that protect centralized or clustered IT resources. A variety of envi
ronmental threats, threat agents, and precautions are identified. Questions to help assess the
security of off-site storage of backup media are provided. Procedures for establishing the tran
sition strategy to the IT facility, authentication, access control logs, suggestions for handling
emergency conditions, and other considerations are enumerated.

INTRODUCTION
In the early days of computing, computers — and the information they processed — were
protected in the most fundamental way; they were locked up, with entry limited to a few autho
rized operators, administrators and programmers. Today, computers are cheaper, smaller, por
table, and more accessible to almost eyeryone. With computers on eyery desk, connected yia
networks to other local and remote systems, it has become less and less feasible to protect infor
mation with the old types of physical security deyices. As a consequence, other types of security
haye become more important. But despite adyanc(;s in computer security and communications
security, physical security remains a crucial component of an organization's total security plan.
Physical security must protect the system from a myriad of threats on a daily basis. As Tom
Wadlow indicates (200, p. 101), some of the troublesome day-to-day incidents in a computer
facility include:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Employees tampering with equipment
Improper access to backup tapes and archives
Accidental disconnection of production equipment
Power circuit overload from unplanned equipment addition
Power failure
Water damage
Theft

To effectively deal with these issues and more, the physical security goal must support the
system security posture. "The goal is to create layers of protection that can support the security
policy and provide reasonable protection against threats that are of the greatest concern" (Wadlow,
2000, p. 103). In some ways, physical security is the easiest and most rewarding type of security.
It is tangible, very visible and reassuring. With that said, it is important to note that it is also very
easy to go overboard with physical security and worry about unrealistic issues. Designers of
physical security solutions must be aware of this tendency and try to ensure that there is balance
between what is to be protected and the methods that are taken to protect it.

PHYSICAL SECURITY PHILOSOPHY
The general philosophy of physical security is usually a mix between restrictive and per
missive philosophies. Within a security layer, people are governed by a more or less permissive
model. Once people are allowed into that area, they can go anywhere they would like within it. In
contrast, movement between layers is a more restrictive model. No one can cross between layers
except in an explicitly authorized manner. In designing the physical security framework for a
facility, one must design the facility in such a way that it is extremely difficult to move between
layers in any way other than the ways that are explicitly permitted (Wadlow, 2000, p. 109).
The Onion Model
One of the most basic physical security models is the onion model, or the layered approach
(Wadlow, 2000, p. 103). Figure 1 illustrates this model.
In this model, a security process is defined that covers everything from the outside world to
the innermost security vault. The transitions (A, B, C, D) are defined by the protocol or proce
dures for moving from one level to another (Wadlow, 2000, p. 103). The rule is to describe the
various places where physical security is to be applied and then to describe the transition between
the places. The transitions are defined as conditions and paths that allow/prevent traffic between
the layers and how the transition is authorized.
To simplify the illustration, transitions shown in Figure 1 as A, B, C, and D are shown as
one way. In reality, however, transitions are actually defined for moving in both directions. As
mentioned above, movement becomes more restrictive as people transition from the outside to the
innermost secure areas and it should be extremely difficult to move between layers in unautho
rized ways. This is especially important in protecting the network management center and other
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technology clusters of an organization It is very useful to diagram how the transitions are to work
and what the "preferred paths" are between layers. Methods for securing alternate paths must be
identified and addressed. Transitions that occur during an emergency must also be identified-if
security is to be bypassed, procedures must be specified. Another way to define the transitions is
to develop a transition matrix. Figure 2 is a sample transition matrix that shows the parameters
involved in defining transitions between layers. It illustrates two layers-the outside world and the
casual visitors.

Figure 1. Onion Model for Physical Security

Onion Model for Physical Security
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Figure 2. Sample Transition Matrix
Layer

Description

Outside
World

Uncontrolied
area surround
ing the facility

Casual
Visitors

Waiting area
in lobby for
visitors

Personnel
allowed

Transition

Condition

Approved by

Anybody

To Casual
Visitor

0800 to 1800
General business
visitors only

Receptionist

0800 to 1800
Badged employees

Receptionist

1800 to 0800
Prescheduled
appointments only

Security guard

1800 to 0800
Badged employees

Security Guard

Those
approved by
transition from
outside world
and from
employees

To Outside
Worid

None required

To Employee

0800 to 1800
Badged employees
Badged contractors

Badge reader

1800 to 0800
Badged employees

Badge readers
security guard & log
entry

1800 to 0800
Badged contractor

Badge readers
security goard S log
entry. Letter on file from
Contract manager.

0800 to 1800
Visitors

Receptionist and log
entry. Badged
employee/contractor
must escort and sign
for visitor.

1800 to 0800
Visitors

Security guard and log
entry. Badged
employee/contractor
must escort and sign
for visitor.

Emergency
condition 24-hours
a day

Receptionist or security
guard - escorts
optional
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A matrix of this nature may be used to ensure all variables are addressed and helps provide
an element of consistency and continuity within the process.
The Garlic Model
The Garlic Clove model (Wadlow, 2000, p. 110) of physical security is a natural extension
of the onion model. It is more sophisticated, more realistic, and also more complicated. Once a
framework is defined that identifies the layers and pockets within the layers, the physical security
design should be developed to match the framework and support the security policy that is to be
implemented.

Figure 3. Garlic Clove Model for Physical Security
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FINAL PHILOSOPHICAL NOTE
When most people think of physical security, they think of cameras, badge readers, door
sensors, etc. Although these are important elements of physical security, and we will present a
number of technology solutions that could be used to provide security for a computer facility.
procedures play a crucial role and should not be overlooked or forgotten. When you design and
develop a physical security plan, remember to think pathologically and try to identify all the ways
that employees can defeat the system. For example, having a badge reader at an entrance to
identify and authenticate employees is a good solution, but allowing a person to "tailgate" through
the entrance without providing identification or authorization information defeats the entire sys
tem. Having a door sensor that detects a door being opened is another viable ingredient to a
security solution, but if a person can lift a ceiling tile and crawl over the wall and not open the
door to enter the secured area, all could be lost. It is these types of unauthorized transitions that
are usually best addressed through good security system design and security procedures, and we
would be remiss in our discussion if we did not draw attention to the need for user-friendly
procedures as a vital piece to the physical security puzzle.

PHYSICAL SECURITY—A MACRO VIEW
Before we discuss providing security for a computer facility, we must first look at the big
picture. Securing a corporate computer facility or network management center is a critical ele
ment of a much larger plan. An understanding of the total solution and security goals is necessary
to establish a context for the safeguards provided to protect centralized or clustered information
technology resources.
Physical Security Goals
The three primary goals are deterrence, minimize loss, and notification (ADT). Physical
security can be a deterrent to criminal activity. Cameras are a good example of this. They can be
either overt or covert. Overt cameras are not hidden and a monitor may be visible to indicate
"we're taping and watching!" Overt cameras are part of a prevention plan. Covert cameras are
behind one-way mirrors or similar "screens" to keep them from view. Covert cameras are part of
a detection plan. In addition to deterring unauthorized events and activities, physical security is
established to minimize loss in the event of an unauthorized entrance to a restricted area. Provid
ing additional locks and access controls means that a perpetrator must have more knowledge and
skill to defeat your defense mechanisms. Finally, notification must occur to enable a quick re
sponse. The intent is to avoid a confrontation and allow the proper authorities to intercede and
take appropriate action.
Critical Factors
Most security experts concur that budget is at the top of the list of critical factors for
physical security. In providing a total solution, balance must prevail in terms of what is to be
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protected and the methods used to protect it. The s:ifeguards that are selected and implemented
must reduce the risk to an acceptable level based upon realistic threats and the sensitivity and
criticality of the assets that are to be protected. In many instances, an organization implements
both area and point coverage to minimize the risks .and optimize its investment.
Monitoring is another critical element in the physical security solution. Most vendors pro
vide Central Monitoring Stations that are staffed 24-7-365. This around the clock coverage en
ables them to respond to a broad range of events in a timely manner. Being able to respond
quickly is key to this facet of physical security. In fact, many insurance companies offer dis
counts to policyholders that have independent central monitoring capabilities. By outsourcing
this function, many corporations reduce their overhead and infrastructure costs while maintain
ing a high level of support and service.
In the most critical areas, redundancy must also be provided. By using multiple devices and
sensors, checks and balances are established within the system. Tracking a sequence of events or
a "non-sequence" helps identify real incidents from false alarms. For example, having a door
sensor triggered followed by several motion sensors is a good indication there is an intrusion.
Having a single motion sensor go off may only indicate there is a spider sitting on the sensor.
Redundancy is also critical for maintaining operations when there is a major system failure. For
example, ADT—the largest security company in America—has Redundant Central Monitoring
Stations so that if a natural disaster occurs at their laome office in Florida, the signals can be re
routed to another site and service would continue. This clearly illustrates the need for continuous
protection and the notion that if one system is compromised, security is maintained, as there are
other systems in place to provide the desired security coverage.
Procedures are a critical element to a successful physical security program. Procedures
define roles and responsibilities, what's allowed, and what's not. For example, employees may
prop open a door for UPS or FedEx delivery. Such action defeats the entire system and must be
discouraged. Also, having a procedure for emergency response conditions will be necessary
when security must be bypassed for safety or other critical reasons. If a fire breaks out in a
storage area, security will be the last thing on people's minds when fire fighters arrive. In addition
to procedures, security training can provide significant benefits to a corporation. Most security
threats are related to people. It is common knowledge that employees want to "get the job done"
and to follow the rules; however, they frequently don't know what the rules are. Any security
measure that is not understood, that is confusing, or that is viewed to be overly complicated will
be considered an impediment to productivity and will be circumvented at every opportunity. To
combat this, each and every employee needs to know why security is important and what he/she
can and should do to support an organization's security policy. Training can provide the answers
to many employee questions and create awareness of security policy, practices and procedures. It
is an important means for alerting employees when there is a change in policy and/or procedures.
Securing the Perimeter
Within the United States there are over a million surveillance cameras in place for private
businesses, federal and state governments, apartment buildings, airports and train stations.
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garages, retail stores, banks, and restaurants. Most of these systems are used to monitor open
areas and entrances and they employ video tape recorders to capmre unlawful events and random
street activity. This can be an important source of evidence for law officials and for prosecuting
people who engage in unauthorized activities. Cameras are generally mounted at the comers of
buildings for area coverage and within close proximity to entrances for point coverage.
Securing External Entrances—Transitioning to Casual Visitor
There is usually a receptionist and/or security guard in the main lobby or on the floor to
greet both employees and visitors. All employees and contractors should wear photo ID badges
for identification purposes. Visitors should sign in upon arrival and when leaving. Visitors should
be given a visitor's badge when they arrive and it should be collected before they depart the
premises. Visitors should wear the badge for the duration of the visit and be escorted by employ
ees to and from meetings. Anyone not wearing a badge should be reported to security for further
investigation.
All external entrances should be equipped with a card access system. Authorized employ
ees and contractors should have access cards to enter the building. Entrances that are restricted
such as the loading dock area, should limit access. The access cards should allow employees to
transition from the outside world (refer to Figures 1 and 3) to casual visitor with minimal inter
vention during normal working hours and before or after normal hours. The access card system
should log card use of all employees, especially during non-standard hours of operation.
Securins Internal Entrances—Transitionins to Emvlovee
The same access cards will allow authorized employees and contractors to transition from
casual visitor to employee space (refer to Figures 1 & 3). The access card system should enable
employees to move freely within the employee space. It should log all accesses to include date/
time, specific door, employee or card ID. The Security Office will ensure that access cards are
properly protected and that cards are collected and disabled when employees terminate their
relationship with the organization.

PHYSICAL SECURITY—THE MICRO VIEW
We are not ready to discuss the physical security requirements for centralized or clustered
information technology resources. We believe that we have sufficiently described the "big pic
ture" to set the stage and establish a "context" for discussing the safeguards that are needed to
protect centralized or clustered information technology resources. The effectiveness of the safe
guards that follow is significantly dependent upon the physical security and transition strategies
that have been described above.
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Environmental Threats to the Computer Facility
We will begin our discussion of physical security for computer facilities by identifying the
environmental threats to IT resources and the precautions that could be taken to counter the
threat.

Figure 4. Computer Facility Threats and Precautions
THREAT AGENT

THREAT

PRECAUTIONS

Fire

Destruction of IT
resources/assets

• Smoke detectors
• Fire extinguishers
• Sprinkler systems
• Special gas (Halon)

Smoke

Media and component
damage

Smoke detectors

Water

Flooding via rain,
broken pipes, ice,
sprinkler systems

• Water sensors in ceiling
• Water sensors above and below raised floors

Electricity

Surges and outages

•
•

Line filters on computer's power supply
Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) on
devices
• Special circuits with isolated ground on
each system
• Anti-static carpets

Lightning

Destruction of IT
resources/assets

• Turn off and unplug devices
• Grounded storage area for backup media

HVAC (heating,
ventilation, air
conditioning)

High/low temperatures,
high/low humidity, or
excessive dust

• Temperature sensors/gauges
• Humidity sensors/gauges
• Filters
• Heating and air conditioning

Earthquake/
Vibration

Equipment/media
damage

•' Set up computer room on lower floors of a
building
•' Keep equipment away from windows
• Protect equipment from falling objects
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Note that off-site storage of backup media is essential in each of these cases. The choice of
a backup site is crucial, as are the procedural controls that are in place and enforced at the site.
Many organizations choose a site that is too close to their local operation and whatever disaster
impacts one site, generally impacts the other. System backup and local and off-site storage policy
should address access control issues. The following questions are questions that would most
likely be asked in a risk assessment to determine vulnerabilities in system backup procedures and
off-site storage.
•

Are backups done regularly?

•

Are they done correctly ?

•

Are they usable? When was the last time they were tested?

•

How are the backups protected on site? Are they susceptible to theft? Who could steal
them?

•

Other than needing a tape and not being able to find it, is there a systematic way to notice if
a backup tape is missing or stolen?

•

How difficult is it to locate a specific backup tape that is stored locally? When was the last
time someone tried?

•

How are the backups stored off site?

•

Who can send or recall tapes from off site? What happens if this person is unavailable?

•

What ensures that tapes sent off site cannot be accessed by anyone except authorized people
in your organization?

•

How long does it take to recover a tape from off site storage? Has this been tested in all
seasons and in inclement weather? Are there procedures for emergency recovery 24 hours a
day? Who must authorize emergency recovery?

•

If there were a major disaster, are the key backups necessary to restore service on site, in
off-site storage, or somewhere else?

•

What hardware, software, or knowledge, if any, other than physical possession of the tape,
is needed to restore files from the tape? Who controls the hardware, software, or knowl
edge? Is there potential for this person to abuse this control? What happens if this person is
unavailable?

Securing the Computer Facility—Transitionine to MIS/IT
With computers on every desktop, the challenge today is not only to lock the office, but to
adquately protect wiring closets, "server farms," and corporate mainframes as well. Computer
resources are distributed throughout a building in addition to being clustered within a computer
room. The first line of physical defense is to take appropriate steps to secure the multitude of
areas where the IT components reside.
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If funding is limited, the existing access control system should be extended to protect the
MIS/IT facilities. The same access cards should allow authorized employees and contractors to
transition from employee space to MIS/IT space (refer to Figures 1 & 3). The access control
system should log all accesses to include date/time, specific door, employee or card ID. The
Security Office will ensure that access cards are properly protected and that cards are collected
and disabled when employees terminate their relationship with the organization. Access to the
facilities must be stringently controlled and monitored. The number of people who may grant
access to these restricted areas must be kept to a minimum and there should be special approval
required prior to granting an employee or contractor access to the MIS/IT facility.
If funding is not an issue, a separate identification and authentication system should be
used to protect the MIS/IT resources. Most identification and authentication requirements are
implemented via a challenge-response system. "Who are you?" is the identification challenge and
"Prove it!" is the authentication challenge. Employees must respond appropriately to both chal
lenges to gain access. There are different methods for authentication. They are discussed below.
By having a separate MIS/IT access control system, corporations have an additional safeguard
that if the "corporate access" system is compromised, the MIS/IT access control system will
continue to function. Cameras may be used for redundancy and for an electronic record of actual
"faces" that enter and exit the restricted area.

Authentication
Authentication is critical to authorizing entry into "restricted areas." There are three prin
ciples of authentication shown in Figure 5. Each of tliese methods will enhance security and make
it more difficult to circumvent security measures.

Figure 5. Authentication Principles
Principles of
Authentication

" Method of
" ~ Authentication

" Example

Something
you know

Passwords

Password or
Personal Identification Number
(PIN)

Something
you have

Tokean/SmartCards

SecurlD Token RSA
Smartcard

Something
you are

Biometrics

Fingerpring, voice print, retinal scan
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These methods may be used separately or combined. Many organizations use hardware
tokens or SmartCards with passwords or PINs. Because there are two factors involved, it is
harder to compromise. Not only would a perpetrator have to know the password, but he/she
would also need to have the physical token as well.
Access Control Loss
Physical access control logs are just as important as the logical access control logs that are
kept and maintained for our networks and applications. With this in mind, it is critical that we
take the same precautions and measures to safeguard these electronic records. Wadlow (p. 117)
provides a number of questions that should be posed to the personnel that maintain the physical
access control systems for an organization.
•

How are the access control system logs collected?

•

How are they backed up?

•

Do they log failed attempts?

•

Who can change access control policy for an employee or contractor?

•

What approval is required?

•

Can the access control system distinguish between the valid badge holder and someone
holding a proper badge?

•

Is there a way to cross check access to restricted areas, perhaps via videotape?

Additional Considerations
Remember to protect the unprotected—walls should extend above dropped ceilings and
below raised floors to prevent an intruder from bypassing door sensors. If it is important, take
appropriate steps to ensure that air ducts are small enough to prevent a person from using them to
gain unauthorized physical access to your IT resources. Avoid glass walls and protect cabling
from unauthorized taps or sniffers by running it through protective conduit if possible. Use sur
veillance devices where appropriate. Be prepared for denial of service. Be sure the security de
sign addresses the following questions.
•

What access will there be to MIS/IT facilities if the badge access control system is out of
commission?

•

What access will there be to those areas during a power failure?

•

What access to those areas must be provided for fire safety? What would jeopardize your
security during a safety drill or emergency?

•

Are there mechanical keys to the secure doors? Who has them? How is their use logged?

•

Are keys stored inside and externally to the MIS/IT facility to prevent someone from lock
ing themselves out?
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It is usually feasible and sensible to deal with tlnese issues by equipping doors with a fire
safety bar. It allows the door to be opened without power, but sets off a very loud, batteryj owered alarm if the door is opened.

SUMMARY
Physical access control, identification and authentication, and transition protocols between
! ecure and non-secure areas are critical to physical se;curity. Procedures and training cannot be
I iverlooked in making employees know what is and is not allowed. Cameras are good for both
' irevention and detection capabilities. Redundancy is key to validating information and ensuring
hat resources are still protected even if one system ftdls or is compromised. Emergency proce
dures should be tested before there is an emergency and under a variety of circumstances.
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